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PROGRESS, INNOVATION AND
TECHNOLOGY: A DELICATE "GOOGLE"
BALANCE
ROBERT I. REIS t
ABSTRACT
This article presents observations, questions, and commentary
focusing on present and future copyright and patent paradigms. Part I
addresses the expansion of substantive content rights, the dramatic
extension of term duration of copyright, and the revolutionary expansion of
new technologies that are core to fundamental objectives and benefits of
copyright. It notes the escalating fixation of Congress and the courts on
protection of intellectual "property" rights when often it appears in
contravention of constitutional purpose. Part II addresses the tension
created by Google's adventures in information technologies, particularly
those at the fringe of private rights and constitutional purpose. While
Google's search engine, data collection, use of data, presentation of data,
forays in operating systems, and smart devices present copyright, patent,
privacy, and social issues, the catalyst for a copyright paradigm shift is
likely inherent in Google's Book project and litigation stemming from their
growing stable of smart devices built on the Android Operating System.
The tension is created by Google's global presence, ubiquity, and incessant
technological innovation - factors collectively setting the stage for a
fundamental shift in the distribution, and use of intellectual content. These
activities are consistent in purpose with constitutional purpose but, in
current contexts, incompatible with and "rivalrous" to exclusive rights
granted under current copyright and patent regimes.
f Robert I. Reis, Professor of Law, State University of New York Buffalo School of
Law - Co-Director Intellectual Property Concentration Program.
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I. THE JOURNEY BEGINS: SAILING TO THE DISTANT LAND OF PROGRESS: A
GRATUITOUS PARABLE ON COPYRIGHT
The second decade of the 21st century finds the good ship
"Copyright" sailing to the land of "Progress."' The course is difficult
through the fog created by ambiguities, cliches, and unsubstantiated myths
of progress spurred by monopolistic private rights and legends of resulting
public benefit. The vessel is leaking badly with excesses of appropriated
cargo from the public domain 2 and derivatives. The lower decks are littered
with construction materials deemed necessary to fix leaks and wall off
those designated as infringers and pirates. 3 There is little, if any, current
I The word "progress" was selected because of the critically narrow interpretation given
it in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 213-14, 215 (2003) (rejecting the use of progress as
purpose and limitation in the creation of copyrights). There is considerable scholarship that
refutes the Eldred Court's interpretation of the framers' intent in using "progress" in U.S.
CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. These scholars regard "progress" as a substantive goal to be treated
as mandatory, not prefatory; see generally, Malla Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to
Promote? Defining 'Progress' in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, or
Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754 (2002); see also, Vivian J. Fong,
Progress: Are We Making Progress?: The Constitution As A Touchstone For Creating
Consistent Patent Law And Policy, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1163 (2009); Dotan Oliar, The
(Constitutional) Convention On IP: A New Reading, 57 UCLA L. REV. 421 (2009).
2 See, e.g., Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1186-87 (10th Cir. 2007); Boisson v.
Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 269-70 (2d Cir. 2001).
3 See, e.g., The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-02 (2006) (anti
circumvention provisions); Digital Economy Act 2010, available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/24/introduction/enacted (Last visited June 23,
2011); One that didn't make it was the Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S.
2560, 108th Cong. (2004). The bill was proposed to the Senate by Orrin Hatch and was
directed at the intentional inducement of copyright violations. While it was represented as
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empirical evidence that the rewards of exclusive rights and economic gain
are coincident with the purpose of public benefit. Ledger books have never
justified the need for excess baggage that eschews distributive creativity
and innovation in the spread of enabling knowledge. Assumption and
recantation have replaced the not so "common sense" that understood the
relationship of reward to the purpose and good of the nation.The good ship
"Copyright" will have a difficult journey to the promised land of "Progress"
unless it jettisons some of the appropriated cargo that make paper laws
fragile in rapidly changing times. These are times that bear witness to
"dazzling" 4 technologies for creative use that excite and fuel contemporary
normative disconnects. The course must be altered and set with clear
restatement of public benefit, requirement of validation, and empirical
proof that the means (copyright and patent) serve the ends of public
benefit.5 Legislative rules and judicial decisions must return to a balance
that ensures focus on public benefits (ends), not merely the aggregation of
wealth from reward in the private sector. 6 There should be no more
protection of the means than necessary to ensure minimal detriment to the
public beneficial user and the goals of societal progress. Private rights must
be put to positive public beneficial use or be deemed abandoned or
terminated. To this end, there should be "no right" of a non-user for the
public benefit as an incident of the copyright. At this leg of the voyage, are
private rights necessary for spurring innovation and creation? Are there
other regimes spurring more creation, innovation, and progress? Why
mortgage the future and prevent for any period of time the very seeds of
creativity and innovation? 7
neutral and not contrary to copyright purpose, it died an early death. Some of the language
of the proposed legislation is reminisced in MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
913, 125 S.Ct. 2764, (2005).
4 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 831 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev'd
sub nom. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (description of
the Google search engine by Judge Howard Matz).
5 The recent reluctance of a math genius to accept a one million dollar prize for solving
a math problem speaks to the creative process relative to motivation of real genius by
rewards motivational effects (or lack thereof) of rewards upon real genius and the creative
process. See Irina Titova and Malcom Ritter, 'Nyet' to $1 Million? Math Genius May Reject
Award, THE NEW YORK TIMES, March 29, 2010, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36086633/ns/technologyandscience-science/t/nyet-
million-math-guru-may-reject-it/ (last visited June 22, 2011).
6 See Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007); but cf Golan v. Ashcroft, 310
F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Colo. 2004) (10th cir. states that the reward to authors and inventors is
the purpose for granting exclusive rights while the district court notes the delicate between
private rights, public interest, and the desired progress which flows from those means).
7 See, Tim Harford, How to fire up the Innovation Engine, WIRED, Vol. 19.06 June
2011. He presented constructs to fuel innovation in stark contrast to what may be an
outmoded model of reward creating exclusive rights for limited times: "...there are two solid
models that have already proven effective at cracking problems and pushing past plateaus.
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A. Early Warnings and Constitutional Purpose: A Lineal Progression
There were any number of early warnings by scholars concerned with
the future of intellectual activities and expansion of copyrights as a means
to the end of progress. 8 It is more than likely that early copyrights served
this function, albeit limited little by way of bounds and the designation of
"limited [t]imes," "original," and "progress" as purpose. The coincidence of
reward for contribution to progress was reasonably based on faith and the
implicit belief that through publication and the expansion of knowledge,
protected private rights would be put to public use through emulation,
adaptation, integration, and expansion of knowledge. 9 The transition to the
gratuitous characterization of the constitutional reward as property was
coincident with the onset of systematic denigration of the public beneficial
interest. In the period to follow, copyright expanded in subject matter from
literal protection of the right to make copies to inclusion of derivative uses
that previously may have been understood as the quid pro quo for private
rights and progress. The copyright interest was, in fact, granted during this
period for a limited time, and often regarded as a justification for
privatization simply by referencing the reversion of that interest to the
The first approach is for governments to fund large prizes for successful innovations. This is
an old idea: The French government used a prize to spur the invention of canned food; the
British government established the famous Longitude Prize in 1714. Innovation prizes can
provide serious money while preserving a pluralistic, "anyone can try" quality. [Likewise]
everyone assumed the astronomers of the Royal Observatory would find a way for ships to
determine their longitude; in fact, the solution came from a village carpenter with a gift for
making accurate clocks." ( available at
http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/05/st-essayinnovation/).
8 See generally JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (Prometheus Books 2001);
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (Basic Books 1999); SIVA
VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY (N.Y. Univ. Press 2001).
9 See Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992) (Article I,
section 8 of the Constitution authorizes Congress "to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." The Supreme Court has stated that "the economic
philosophy behind the clause... is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare ... ." Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
219, 98 L. Ed. 630, 74 S. Ct. 460 (1954). The author's benefit, however, is clearly a
"secondary" consideration. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158,
92 L. Ed. 1260, 68 S. Ct. 915 (1948). "The ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate
artistic creativity for the general public good." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422
U.S. 151, 156, 45 L. Ed. 2d 84, 95 S. Ct. 2040 (1975). Thus, the copyright law seeks to
establish a delicate equilibrium. On the one hand, it affords protection to authors as an
incentive to create, and, on the other, it must appropriately limit the extent of that protection
so as to avoid the effects of monopolistic stagnation. In applying the federal act to new types
of cases, courts must always keep this symmetry in mind. Id.).
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public domain at the termination of the copyright. These elements of
limitation are consistent with the notion of limited powers granted to the
federal government by the states. They are also in turn consistent with the
power then delegated in the Constitution to Congress. Without these words
of limitation and purpose, the acts of Congress may well have been thought
as ultra vires. There were few serious challenges to congressional acts early
on, likely because of the minimal restrictions upon duration and the "right"
of fair use by the public as a balance between private rights and public
benefit.
The later part of the 19th century began the change in the balance
between private rights and the fair use of the incidents of creativity.
Folsom v. Marsh1° was the first case to set forth standards for fair use
limitation, encompassing the non-literal copying of published works using
less than the entire original work. It also is the first case to use "pirate" and
"pirated" as a characterization of an alleged infringer11 which has
pejoratively haunted public use ever since. The accepted course of
challenging intellectual property has generally been "inside the box,"
manipulating and questioning within the bounds set by legislation and
cases. 12 There has been little by way of effective public challenge to the
power of Congress in the adversarial process. 13 A similar observation can
be made of representation of the public interest in Congress. 14 The primary
10 Folsom v. Marsh, 6 Hunt Mer. Mag. 175, 9 F. Cas. 342, (Circuit Court, D.
Massachusetts, Oct Term 1841) (hereinafter Folsom).
I I/d. at 345.
12 Professor Goldstein noted that one size does not fit all, that fair use should be context
driven and that new technologies not considered by the copyright statute have equities of
their own. Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433, 438 (2008)
("What cases in this category have more or less in common is a new technology, of course:
the technology's general omission from the Copyright Act; the increasingly broad and
systematic, rather than episodic, use of the new technology by consumers; [and] a
consequently increasing aggregate social value of the use[.] . . . [T]he absence of one or
more of these features predicts that no serious claim of fair use will be made for the new
technology.... These new technology cases have equities and efficiencies - and politics - of
their own. . . ."). In addition, the "Fair Use: 'Incredibly Shrinking' or Extraordinarily
Expanding" conference analyzed the multiple facets and limitations of conventional
analysis. See Charles von Simson, Kernochan Conference Analyzes Changing Contours of
Fair Use, Columbia Law School,
http://www.law.columbia.edu/media inquiries/news events/2008/ february 2008/fairuse.
13 Note the relatively limited amicus participation in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186
(2003), and the exponential growth of public participation in Grokster, in which over 60
Amicus briefs were filed (raising the specter of future litigation involving the Google Book
Project and Amended Settlement); see also, Robert I. Reis, The Public Beneficial Interest in
the Intellectual Commons: The Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine and Necessary
Standing to Represent the Public Interest, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc
/papers2/Reis.pdf.
14 See LITMAN, supra note 8, at 61-63. See generally WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS
AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS (2010).
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focus of Congress has been on private rights, pirates, infringers, and
enabling technologies. One consequence of this focus results in the
enactment of regulations to protect the wealth of private right holders with
minimal observable concern for collateral damage to the public purpose of
copyright,15 all under the myth of coincidence and mark of property. 
16
B: The Great Divide: When Coincidence Becomes Consumptive and
Rivalruous
Intellectual property rights as currently constituted are both rivalrous
and consumptive. The combined consequence of the above often means that
they are often "mutually exclusive" of one another. The exclusionary
character and duration of these rights inhibit, rather than enhance,
innovation and progress. These rights diminish the foundation for progress
by restraining competition, a proven precondition for progress. To date, the
legislature and the courts have given little attention to the public benefits
that result from the use of privatized intellectual content, instead choosing
to focus on the protection of the vast riches in the treasure chests of
intellectual property right holders. For some, Google represents the
shadowed figure of a fabled knight who champions public rights because of
its use of open technologies17 , ubiquitous and expanding adventures in
information management. The Google Book project has the potential, by
15 When one hears the term DRM (Digital Rights Management), one thinks of protection
of intellectual content in digital form belonging to the copyright holder. Interesting, but how
about changing that to DCMPBU (Digital Content Management to Maximize Public
Beneficial Use)? In a blow to a leading copyright protection organization, a Barcelona court
ruled on March 9, 2009, that peer-to-peer download networks are legal under Spanish
intellectual property law. See generally, Mark Hefflinger, Spanish Court Declares P2P Link
Sites, Filesharing Legal, DIGITAL MEDIA WIRE, March 15, 2010,
http://www.dmwmedia.com/news/2010/03/15/spanish-court-declares-p2p-link-sites-
filesharing-legal.
16 See, e.g., Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-315, 122 Stat.
3078 (2008) (specifically provisions mandating that colleges and universities counsel
students on downloading and copyright protection under threat of reduction of institutional
financial support and withdrawal of student loans); Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub.
L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998); Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-
298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) [hereinafter CTEA]; Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349,
35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
17 For a succinct introduction to, and definition of "Open" concepts in computing and
information contexts see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opensource (Last visited June 22,
2011). Google has participated in or singularly developed open source software and
hardware projects ranging from operating systems, 3D design, and productivity suites to
mobile phones, tablet computers, and smart televisions. See
http://code.google.com/opensource/ (Last visited June 22, 2011). See also
http://www.google.com/mobile/ (Last visited June 22, 2011); http://www.google.com/tv/
(Last visited June 22, 2011); and http://www.android.com/ (Last visited June 22, 2011).
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scanning all the books in the library, to archive all works for posterity. It
has the potential of constitutional purpose: to publish, distribute, and permit
identification and retrieval of intellectual content on a scale unimaginable
(except by fiction writers) less than a decade ago. 18 To digitalize, to "copy"
literally every word, every "." and every "I," and then permit the world
access through search engines and artificial intelligence, and, in an instant,
to find a source or phrase of every work that is either in the public domain
or copyrighted, is beyond dazzling. These benefits are not simply fair use or
transformative use, but rather, the root right of public beneficial use that
raises immutable public policy issues that are inherent in the intent of the
constitutional delegation of power given to Congress. Perhaps there is a
twist of fate in the Court's decision to reject the settlement agreement on
procedural grounds rather than note that the terms and provisions of the
settlement agreement must be construed in light of settled authority.19 The
court's reasoning is the catalyst for speculation on a complex of matters that
help clarify the fundamental disconnect in public right representation.
Despite repetitive judicial deference to the Congress, the focus of the
court should have been on public benefit as the intended purpose of
copyright.20 From this perspective the court could have simply approved
the ASA noting that all provisions must be construed in light of settled
authority, treaties, and statutes. There is little indication, however, that
anything was done to identify, measure, or otherwise affirmatively attempt
to secure the public benefit.21 Search though one might, there is no
validation, empirical or otherwise, of how copyright functions to achieve
the requisite public benefits or progress. Copyrights are "presumed" to
serve these purposes by the creation of private rights in the publication and
the distribution of expression original to the author without supporting
focus on rights of use in the public.22 Copy "rights" were once defined by
functions necessary to ensure publication and the spread of knowledge.2 3 In
18 "The benefits of Google's book project are many. Books will become more accessible.
Libraries, schools, researchers, and disadvantaged populations will gain access to far more
books. Digitization will facilitate the conversion of books to Braille and audio formats,
increasing access for individuals with disabilities. Authors and publishers will benefit as
well, as new audiences will be generated and new sources of income created. Older books-
particularly out-of-print books, many of which are falling apart buried in library stacks-will
be preserved and given new life." The Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666,
670 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
19 Id. at *679, 686.
20 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
21 See generally Pollack, surpa note 1, at 760, 769-71. It should be noted that Professor
Pollack also filed an amicus brief in Eldred.
22 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (allowing for the fair use of copyrighted works) is more a
limitation on the right of use than an enablement.
23 Fong, supra note 1, at 1167-84; Pollack, supra note 1, at 755-56.
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the abstract for Professor Pollack's article, one fmds the following: "the
1789 meaning of progress is spread.",24 Where does one find any focus on
the rights necessary to achieve these ends? Or, what about questioning the
need for limitations on private rights to ensure purpose or prevent collateral
harms? 25 If learning and progress represent furthering the ends of copyright
for the public good, then why the fixation on limiting wide spread use of
new technologies for publication, distribution and use of those elements of
creativity "bound" within the copyrighted materials? 2 6 Secondary liability
is a limiting factor for the protection of public use interests often to the
detriment of the constitutional purpose of copyright by losing sight of the
ultimate purpose.2 7 Lest we think of this unique to this country, recall the
new UK Digital Economy Act.
2 8
Considerable deference is accorded to the most minimal "original"
expression in the granting of a copyright. 2 9 It is ironic that despite this
minimal threshold, there is no prerequisite of proof to validate either the
claim of authorship or the source of the alleged author's inspiration. The
lack of authentication creates both private and public problems in the use of
intellectual content since, once registered, the copyrighted work is entitled
to a presumption of validity. 30 The absence of public representation on this
issue may be a misplaced elitist notion that the classes of creators who have
been rewarded by copyright have more to offer than the infinitely greater
creative potential of the many who may be denied access or use by the
privatization of elements necessary for further creative activity. Evidence of
collective creativity from the end of the second Ice Age, coupled with the
incredible genius of far-flung cultures spanning times to the advent of
24 Malla Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining 'Progress' in
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Unites States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress
Clause, Abstract, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754 (2002), available at http://papers
.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=304180.
25 See, e.g., Robert I. Reis, Rights and Remedies Post Ebay v. MercExchange - Deep
Waters Stirred, 2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 133 (2008).
26 Id.
27 Even the new administration follows the new worn path by appointing an IP czar to
protect intellectual property rights urged by the content industry. Michael Mesnick, Obama
Finally Appoints IP Czar, Puts it in the Wrong Department, TECHDIRT, Sept. 25, 2009,
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20090925/1549476326.shtml.
28 UK Digital Economy Act, supra note 3; But see, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 416
F. Supp. 2d 828, 831 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev'd sub nom. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) ("The principal two-part issue in this case arises out of the
increasingly recurring conflict between intellectual property rights on the one hand and the
dazzling capacity of internet technology to assemble, organize, store, access, and display
intellectual property "content" on the other hand."); see also, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Kelly v Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
For an example of one of the better discussions, see PATRY, supra note 14.
29 See generally, Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
30 Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 268 (2d Cir. 2001).
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copyright, raises questions of empirical coincidence in intellectual property
assessment.31
The foundation of current scholarship is the past. The field of
Ontogeny refers to origin or genesis, usually taught in biology as
"Ontogeny recapitulate Phylogeny," in terms of human physical
development. But is that not also the case with creative processes of living
organisms and human development? Learning and "progress" are certainly
subject to these wonders as well as limitations. Perhaps this is simply a
variant of Newton's reference to standing on the shoulders of giants
metaphor that acknowledges "[o]ne who develops future intellectual
pursuits [does so] by understanding the research and works created by
notable thinkers of the past." 32 While found in a writing of Sir Isaac
Newton, other sources attribute it to Bernard of Chartres in the twelfth
century.33 Fact can be found in simple proof of the statement itself.
34
Validation of contemporary copyright rests on the anecdotal equation
of economic growth and value in the private sector to "progress." This is a
weak foundation for restrictive copyrights in the current technological age.
The equation of economic value with intellectual purpose is a classic
example of syllogistic, fallacious logic designed to perpetuate the belief that
private rights are coincidental with public beneficial use and the intent of
copyright. It avoids fundamental questions about the absence of measure
and the proof of public benefit. It does all this without consideration of
what progress might be or identification of the growing litany of collateral
harms and externalized costs. 35 The majority opinion in Eldred36
exemplifies the practice of avoiding empirical confirmation of the tension
between copyright and public benefit by citing the myth of coincidence
with constitutional purpose to justify its finding. It subsumes the question of
why private rights and public beneficial use aren't recognized as
"rivalrous." It treats public goods as non-rivalrous, but misses the
exclusionary characteristic of copyright and other privatized intellectual
goods.
37
31 For an interestingly authoritative source, see Jesse Bryant Wilder, Art History For
Dummies (2007).
32 Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, WIKIPEDIA, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standingon the shoulders of giants (last visited April 5, 2010).
33 Id.
34 See DAN BROWN, THE LOST SYMBOL (Doubleday 2009) (containing the following on
the inside cover "What is lost will be found.").
35 See WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS (Oxford Univ. Press,
Inc. 2009) (characterizes exclusive rights as a tool to thwart competition and stifle
innovation.).
36 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 215 (2003).
37 See James Boyle, Foreword: The Opposite of Property?, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
1, 5 (2003) (citing Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of
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The negative impact of exclusionary private rights is embarrassingly
at the heart of any number of high profile controversies. A few high profile
cases illustrate the problem of ambiguity in the intersection of private rights
and public usage. 38 The most egregious of outcomes dealing with
exclusionary rights associated with intellectual property is a patent case that
clearly indicates the harm to the public at the extreme. Continental Paper
Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 39 although clearly an extreme situation,
allows one to ask what is not "rivalrous" and consumptive about a private
right when the holder doesn't use it, but prevents anyone else from using
the subject matter of the patent right. The inclusion of, duration of, and
protection of "intellectual property" increasingly nibbles away at and
minimizes its use by the public for the intended constitutional purpose. The
Copyright Act of 1976 may become, in time, recognized as the penultimate
example of a statutory minimization of the public right of use without
significant public representation or benefit. 40 In one swoop, a large portion
of the remaining public right was diminished under the guise of codifying
judicial decisions. This cover of codification mischaracterizes and
minimizes changes that may forever alter the paradigm of using otherwise
public goods. From narrow literal copy protection to broader derivative
rights, from public right to affirmative defense, proves once again for every
action there is a reaction. Every change has a significant consequence, and
that is clearly the impact of these changes under the Copyright Act of 1976.
Copyright and public purpose, whether "progress," or "spread" or simply
public right of use, are increasingly mutually exclusive, rivalrous, and
consumptive. While it may be true that many intellectual activities are
neither rivalrous nor consumptive and can be used simultaneously by many,
that proposition is not necessarily true of the subject matter of either
copyright or patents. The right to exclude is by definition rivalrous and, to
the extent it affects the ability not only to use but to exclude over time, it is
Public Property in the Information Age, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 90 (2003)).
38 See e.g., Warner Bros. Entm't Inc. v. RDR Books (The Lexicon Case), 575 F. Supp.
2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Baigent v. The Random House Group (The Da Vinci Code Case),
[2006] EWHC 719 (U.K.); Danny Eccleston, Coldplay Vs. Satriani: The Verdict!, MOJO,
Dec. 12, 2008,
http://www.mojo4music.com/blog/2008/12/coldplayvsjoesatriani-the-vl.htm (Last
visited June 23, 2011) (discussing Joe Satriani's lawsuit against Coldplay for alleged
infringement of his music). The lawsuit ended in settlement, but not until the world knew
that Satriani's score was maybe not all that original and where Coldplay got their version
was certainly open to question. Depending on how one views it, the result of the lawsuit was
a win-win or lose-lose situation; regardless, it clearly involved underlying public interest
issues. Report On The Determination Of An Action, Satriani v. Martin, No. 08-07987 (C.D.
Ca. 2009).
39 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
40 See LITMAN, supra note 8, at 49-51.
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consumptive. Consider the plight of News: if protection of news were
extended under copyright to include facts that would be rivalrous and
potentially consumptive.
4 1
If copyright subject matter were withheld from use by others for life
plus 70 years, that certainly would be consumptive for those intervening
generations who are denied use.
42
In the 'information age', the volume of human knowledge and its
dissemination are greater than ever before and this is surely a cause for
celebration. At the same time, however, our public sphere continues to
shrink. More and more areas are carved out of the public sphere and
enclosed behind digital locks, contracts and property rights; more speech is
commoditized and commercialized, excluding those who cannot afford
access. The masters of the enclosed domain might exercise control over
cash flow, but they also control others' cultural opportunities to express
themselves and participate in the public discourse. If the masters do not like
someone's use of their property, they have an arsenal of technological and
legal means to prevent that use. One of the main legal tools of enclosure is
copyright law. Hence, there is a conflict between copyright and speech.43
In the order of things, this is not simply a set of property right issues.
It wasn't until the later part of the 19th Century that intellectual rights were
called "intellectual property." 44  This categorization forebodes of
fundamental human rights issues, such as ensuring humanity access to and
the benefit of collective genius. Lest this be considered idle utterance,
consider: in England, the House of Lords found the UK Digital Economy
Act (a far reaching Act that protects intellectual property content) to not be
in violation of EU standards of human rights.45 The finding is significant,
but the real question is why would you ask whether the proposal was in
violation of human rights standards if you did not believe there is a human
rights issue to be considered? Is the claim of human rights enough to move
away from the value of private rights as the focus of and justification for
41 See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Announces Second Workshop on
the Future of Journalism (March 9, 2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/03/news2010.shtm (announcing that panelists will discuss
possible changes to copyright law that would "require news aggregators to pay fees to news
gathering operations").
42 See Michael D. Birnhack, Copyrighting Speech: A Trans-Atlantic View, in
COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 37, 37 (Paul L.C. Torremans, ed., 2004).
43 Id. at 37.
44 Intellectual Property, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/lntellectualproperty
(last visited April 5, 2010).
45 See UK Digital Act, supra note 3;See also Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text-en.pdf (Last visited June
23. 2011)
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copyright? 46
It is no easy task to right the way. It will be difficult to manage strong
quartering winds, created by claims of entitlement by copyright holders, for
further legislative action to expand and protect their "rights." It is the huff
and puff and storm of content right holders that is forecast for the present
course. Those charged with piratical appropriation have rebelled and
contend the real pirates may be the current holders of copyrights. They
contend that their acts of use are of right and not infringement and that they
are but privateers recapturing ill-gotten gains.47  The contention is that
some of the paper laws granting such rights are "ultra vires" 48 and,
therefore, in derogation of inalienable rights of use for the public benefit
anticipated by the Constitution.
Eldred and subsequently Golan I and Golan I framed tensions that
have surfaced as a result of any number of Google's adventures in
technology. 49 The CTEA required the Court to explicate two critical issues
regarding limitations on Congress under the constitutional delegation of the
copyright power. The first issue the Court had to resolve was the meaning
of progress (purpose), and the second issue was the meaning of "limited
times." Golan addresses the question of whether and to what extent
restoration of works which passed into the public domain conflict with
fundamental rights and constitutional intent.50
Both of these issues arise from the specific language of the
constitutional power in question. Both are subject to limitations in powers
delegated to the federal government itself, a sense of which reverberates in
recitation of the source of all federal power, the inherent sovereign of the
new nation: "We the people." 51 The Constitution derives legitimacy from
the people. The citizens of the several states, again the people, empower the
states, which in turn were able to create a great nation of delegated and
limited powers. The delegation of powers to the Federal Government was
46 UK Digital Economy Act, supra note 3; see also, Bimhack, supra note 42, at 50;
Michael F. Brown, Why Property and Democracy Are Not Always Allies, 50 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 843, 847-49 (2006); Margaret Chon & Shubha Ghosh, Joint Comment on WIPO Draft
Report: Intellectual Property Needs and Expectations of Traditional Knowledge Holders,
World Intellectual Property Organization, (Nov. 2, 2000),
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/ffi/ffm-report-comments/msgOO008.html.
47 See MICHAEL CRICHTON, PIRATE LATITUDES (Harper Collins 2009).
48 Ultra Vires, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/lltravires (last visited April 5,
2010).
49 Much of the discussion in this section details further matters already noted. Hopefully,
additional detail and context will facilitate an appreciation of the role Eldred may play in the
resolution of issues created by new technologies such as the Google Book Project. See
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
50 See Golan, 501 F.3d 1179; but cf Golan, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215.
51 US CONST. pmbl.
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thus limited, as were the powers delegated to Congress under the
Constitution. This appears to be recognized by the dissenting opinions of
Justice Breyer52 and Justice Stevens, 53 in stark contrast to the position of
the majority that had a running commentary on the errors of the dissenting
Justices thinking throughout the opinion.
54
In the appreciation of both progress as a substantive limitation on the
powers of Congress and the meaning of "limited times" as a limitation on
the means of achieving the goal of progress, bear in mind there were just
twenty powers that were requested for the new federal government.5 5 The
copyright power and patent power were two of the twenty powers requested
for delegation from the states. A third requested power, ostensibly tied with
the first two noted above, was the power to create a national university.
The latter is said to shed light on the purpose of the copyright and patent
powers and the meaning of progress as a core purpose and thereby
limitation on these grants. There is a common sense relationship among the
three as one finds educational aspects in requisite patent requirements of
disclosure, claims, description, enablement, best practices and other patent
inclusions. The design of these disclosures educates in the ways of using
and manufacturing the subject of the patent right. There is no degree of
specificity present for copyrights beyond disclosure (publication),
referencing use and purpose, except that of progress. Progress has meaning,
it means "moving forward towards a goal, advancement in general, implicit
of a good; specific delegated powers from the states to the federal
government limited and delegated. '' 56 Some might suspect that the U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari of Golan to review Eldred's
categorization of "progress" as "prefatory" as "preamble" and thereby not a
limitation on the grant to Congress of the copyright power.
57
Repeated Supreme Court dicta characterize the Intellectual Property
Clause of the United States Constitution as containing both grants of power
and limitations. The Court, however, has yet to explicate the limit imposed
by the Clause's opening words, "to promote the progress of Science and the
useful Arts." Scholars and jurists have assumed without investigation that
"progress" bears the meaning most potent in Nineteenth Century American
52 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 266-67.
53 See id. at 223.
54 See id. at 192-222. Although rejected in at least one copyright case, these basic
principles of sovereignty that limit the power of legislative bodies in other appropriations
from the public domain should rightfully apply to appropriation and privatization of
intellectual "rights." See Reis, supra note 13.
55 Oliar, supra note 1, at 446.
56 RANDOM HouSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1546 (2001).
57 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 211; But see Pollack, supra note 1 (Note: Professor Pollack filed
an amicus brief in Eldred); see also Fong, supra note 1.
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civilization: a continuous qualitative improvement of knowledge inevitably
leading to consensus and human happiness. This article presents empirical
evidence that the 1789 meaning of "progress" is "spread." The original
meaning of Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution is that Congress
has power to pass only such time-limited copyright and patent statutes as
increase the dissemination of knowledge and technology to the public.
Congress' modem focus on providing maximum control and economic
benefit to copyright holders is constitutionally illegitimate.
58
The inclusion of progress as a goal was neither accidental, nor
incidental to the requested copyright power from the states. In a rather
detailed review of the notes of Madison and others during and after the
constitutional convention, the copyright power with the patent power and
education have been linked together reflecting the concern of the
convention. 59 The conclusion supported by the inclusion of progress in
each of the draft proposals confirms the significance it played in the view of
the convention. By the substance of this presentation, progress was not
prefatory, but mandatory and intended a limitation on the power of the
Congress. Progress is the primary substantive reference in the clause
without which, what is the public purpose?60 Despite the common sense of
this question, this issue suffered the fate of a divided Court, clearly divided
focus and philosophy. Protectionists of the private right have again scored
to the determent of the beneficial user. As noted above, one must certainly
question why certiorari has been granted so soon after the decision in
Eldred. Perhaps the Court will use the opportunity to clarify their prior
decision and revisit those elements which may be perceived to work to the
determent of the public beneficial interest.
61
From a beneficial use standpoint, Eldred removed "limited times" as a
functional limitation on the delegation to Congress.62 It is inapposite to take
the meaning of limited, as used in the phrase, out of context. The Court now
has an opportunity to review the use of a dictionary phrase, albeit
mathematically correct, that neither captures the concern, nor the
justification for appropriation from the public domain of rights of use
58 See Pollack, supra note 21 ("The Court, therefore, should hold the Copyright Term
Extension Act to be unconstitutional when it decides Eldred v. Ashcroft next Term...
Article I, section 8, clause 8 is most properly referred to as the "Progress Clause.").
59 James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787,
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/convention/debates/0818.html (Last visited June 23,
2011).
60 Oliar, supra note 1. See also Pollack, supra note 1; Fong, supra note 1.
61 See generally Reis, supra note 13 (particularly the notation of the resurrection of
discretion in discretionary remedies and the clear difference of focus in the two concurring
opinions.) This may be the necessary clarification to achieve balance as the review of Sony
in Grokster citations.
62 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 209-10.
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otherwise available to all. Focus should be on the beneficial purposes that
require a limited term and reversion to the public domain. The proposed
user is isolated as a public domain publisher, refraining the case and issues
as that of private right, rather than public benefit. The issue was cast as a
windfall to the public domain publishers, detriment to foreign authors, and
potential reciprocal protection of domestic rights overseas. 63 Any profits
they realize from their publications are tainted as belonging to the efforts of
foreign authors and publishers wronged by registration defects. 64 The
wrong perspective and thus the wrong questions were implicated by the use
of the word windfall. The focus should be on the expected benefit to the
public. This beneficial use is not only theoretical; it is also an actual benefit
as shown in Golan.65 They, the public, are parties to benefit by increased
access through publication at a reasonable cost. Is that premise not inherent
in the patent system as well? Is this not the basis of the reward in the first
place? Not compensation, but reward? How much is too much private
right? How much is enough control and gain? Limits should be based on
the ability of the public to progress through the use of advances in
technology and related ennoblements.
There are many facets of these issues further informed by Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.66 The purpose of the
copyright clause is not protection of sweat equity, but the benefit that
accrues to the public. The question before the Court should lie in the
justification of term extension on the merits with due consideration to
purpose and rights of the public. The apparent disconnects illustrated here
are crystallized by justification in judicial opinions, as well as the
congressional Record, which focuses on private gain and not public user
benefits. 67 The role of CTEA in providing economic incentives to ensure
63 See 609 F.3d at 1086, 1087 (The Court reasons that restoring public domain works for
foreign authors will lead to reciprocal behavior of foreign nations including China and
Russia.).
64 See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case For Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 313-321 (1970). This article
has generated commentary and rejoinder in several articles that followed.
65 See 609 F.3d at 1081, 1082 (Businesses, performers, and public resources relying
upon the available of public domain works including "orchestra conductors, educators,
performers, publishers, film archivists, and motion picture distributors who have relied on
artistic works in the public domain for their livelihoods. They perform, distribute, and sell
public domain works. The late plaintiff Kapp created a derivative work--a sound recording
based on several compositions by Dmitri Shostakovich.").
66 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
67 Eldred at 206 n.14 ("Members of Congress expressed the view that, as a result of
increases in human longevity and in parents' average age when their children are born, the
pre-CTEA term did not adequately secure 'the right to profit from licensing one's work
during one's lifetime and to take pride and comfort in knowing that one's children -- and
perhaps their children -- might also benefit from one's posthumous popularity.' 141 CONG.
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progress was related to providing authors income to finance new works and
support themselves while creating. The URAA is designed to protect
authors and publishers who failed to perfect or enforce exclusive rights the
first time around - at the expense of those who have made public beneficial
use of long forgotten works.68 These are "sweat of the brow" and
"monetary reward" notions, distinct from earlier notion of the "reward" for
progress. 69 It is reflective of the times that these arguments and reasoning
attempt to justify increasing the economic reward given private right
holders based on anecdotal beliefs that compensation plays a role in
ensuring progress - even where that compensation is theoretical.70
Finally, the Court has taken a limited role in reviewing or construing
congressional exercises of the power granted by the constitution. 7 1 This is a
strange and somewhat strained distancing from the obligations of the Court
in a government of separate but equal and checks and balances. If it is a
limitation on the function of the Court, then it may be judged by some as an
REC. [S]6553 ([daily ed. Mar. 2,] 1995) (statement of Sen. Feinstein); see 144 CONG. REC.
S 12377 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ('Among the main developments
[compelling reconsideration of the 1976 Act's term] is the effect of demographic trends, such
as increasing longevity and the trend toward rearing children later in life . ')."
68 See 609 F.3d at 1076 ("Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
("URAA"), Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976-81 (1994) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A, 109), which granted copyright protection to various foreign
works that were previously in the public domain in the United States.).
69 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 208 n.15 ("Congress also heard testimony from Register of
Copyrights Marybeth Peters and others regarding the economic incentives created by the
CTEA. According to the Register, extending the copyright for existing works 'could ...
provide additional income that would finance the production and distribution of new works.'
[Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 989,
H.R. 1248 and H.R. 1734 Before the Subcomm. On Courts and Intell. Prop. of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 165 (1998)]. . . . 'Authors would not be able to
continue to create,' the Register explained, 'unless they earned income on their finished
works. The public benefits not only from an author's original work but also from his or her
further creations. Although this truism may be illustrated in many ways, one of the best
examples is Noah Webster[,] who supported his entire family from the earnings on his
speller and grammar during the twenty years he took to complete his dictionary. Id. at
165."").
70 See supra note 65.
71 See 770 F. Supp. 2d at 677(The Court states that it defers in "questions of who should
be entrusted with guardianship over orphan books, under what terms, and with what
safeguards are matters more appropriately decided by Congress than through an agreement
among private, self-interested parties. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that 'it is
generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause's
objectives."' Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212, 123 S. Ct. 769, 154 L.Ed.2d 683 (2003);
accord Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429, 104 S. Ct. 774,
78 L.Ed.2d 574 (1984) ("[I]t is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the
scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to authors or to inventors in order to
give the public appropriate access to their work product.")).
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abdication of a fundamental requirement of governance. 72 Reliance on
precedent of Congress' incremental increase in duration does not mean the
interpretation and exercise was historically correct. Nor does it mean that it
justifies forgoing review when there are extraordinary changes in
technologic capacity to achieve goals of widespread public education and
benefit.73 A positive aspect of Eldred, subsequently accepting Certiorari of
Golan, may well be that these decisions help solidify the focus on the future
of copyright in the 21st Century. It accentuates the need to recognize and
protect changes in creative endeavors, publication and distribution of
intellectual resources fundamental to constitutional purpose since the mid
19th Century.
74
Entering the second decade of the new millennium, Google represents
innovation that fuels a growing global sense of deprivation, measured by
the missed potential for enrichment. It constitutes the realization that
private rights are as thin as the paper on which they are written and that
rules sometimes have little bearing on either progress or the general well
being. It is this that provides segues to Google "adventures."
II. GOOGLE: FUELING THE PARADOX: THE WINDS OF CHANGE
The rise of the "Google" adventurist has created a paradox affecting
the relationship of copyright and constitutional purpose. Google "slipped
in" as a small venture beneath the radar of major players in content rights.
Google achieved a mark of dominance in search technologies. Through
innovation and acquisition they quietly added related applications to their
core function. The result of Google's incessant innovative activity in
72 Id. at 223, 235-236 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 242 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
73 Nowhere was this divide more clearly evident than in the two concurring opinions in
eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395-97 (2006). In this six-page opinion one
finds a similar divide in alignment as in Eldred on similar issues affecting the focus and
function of the courts. Justice Ginsburg joined in the first concurring opinion, which did not
want to move away from 150 years of precedent. Justices Stevens and Breyer were in the
second concurring opinion and noted that what might have been right in its time, may no
longer serve the purpose for which the rights were created. They noted the need for
continuing review of rules governing the issuance of injunctions and their application in
current contexts. See Reis, supra note 13.
74 For an excellent perspective on rights, rights of use, of ordinary and extraordinary
expansion of author rights, and thoughtful consideration of public use in light of new
enabling technologies See Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 587
(2008) (Referring to the Google Book Search: "[iut seems clear that today's fair use test
privileges uses that yesterday's test would not, and vice versa. It seems equally clear that
uses that were fair under earlier tests are fair no longer. We haven't stretched fair use, or
shrunk it; we've simply moved it around.... It's not obvious how the test should apply to the
[case] authors and publishers have brought against Google Book Search - (however you
want those cases to come out) . ) (footnotes omitted). See also Reis, supra note 13 at
590.
[Vol 7:2
SUMMER 2010] PROGRESS, INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY
expanding their business model is clear; Google has surpassed all but a few
in revenues, net worth, and most in functional viability. How does this
translate to Google as a difference factor affecting the future of copyright?
Quite simply: Google is global; Google is ubiquitous; Google is non-stop
innovation; Google is value added to any number of processes, applications,
and "enablements." Google has earned the "trust" of the public and elevated
the public sense of entitlement. If the legal system removes these services
from public reach there will be deep sense of loss and deprivation. This
may be the fuel for political action, congressional attention, and further the
normative disconnect. It has been characterized as a bargain between the
public user and Google, the tradeoff being the benefit of the technologies
for the gathering of information about the user by Google. 75 The gift of
enablement, having already become indispensible to the many, means that
public opinion will not likely wilt in the face of denial, but rather be
energized. This represents an interesting quandary for representative
governance and the rule of law. 76 The beneficial uses of Google are not
likely in this political climate to be denied, nor humbled by a single
decision.
The above has significance in the balance between copyright
claimants and Google. Unlike prior technological innovations, such as Peer-
to-Peer (P2P) file sharing or Bit Torrent applications, Google has an
established public purpose and list of non-infringing uses prior to legal
action charging them with infringement. Their innovation and core
functionality has already been challenged and protected. 77 The use of
inference absent evidence of intent in secondary liability cases based on a
snapshot in time when the heaviest first users were infringers without a
portfolio of lawful used to render the technology a "staple article of
commerce" is not an Achilles heel for Google. Google may well be
empirical proof that nascent technologies given the opportunity to mature
make significant fundamental contribution to copyright and constitutional
purpose. It certainly makes one wonder what marvels would be present
75 Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Googlization of Everything, Presentation, sponsored by the
Law & Social Technologies Working Group, The Baldy Center for Law and Policy, State
University of New York, University at Buffalo Law School (March 24, 2010), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aovuDVIHD9k.
76 One only has to look at the proliferation of "Pirate Parties" running candidates for
political office in Europe to understand the will of governance. The Swedish Pirate Party
has already placed at least one member in the legislature. There are at least four other EU
nations that have formed Pirate Parties and there is reputed to be one in England as well.
See, e.g., Results page from a Google search for "Swedish piracy party"
http://www.google.com/#hl=en&source=hp&q=swedish+piracy+party&aq=2&aqi=g5g-m3
& oq=Swedish+pir&fp=64df356c6a3f8304 (last visited June 7, 2010).
77 See Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1169-1172 (9th Cir. 2007)
(characterization by Judge Mantz of Google's technology).
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today had the court focused on constitutional purpose rather than protecting
the status quo ante of copyright.
78
Perhaps an aside, but likely relevant based on the history of public
interest representation in commons or public domain litigation, is the fact
Google has an undeniable ordinal wealth value in conventional monetary
terms. This makes it ever more difficult to minimize Google's activities in
the balance of "commons rights" with private right regimes alleging
harms. 79 Google is a catalyst for change consistent with constitutional
purpose in this digital age. This is true Digital Rights Management as noted
earlier, only the rights being protected are those of the public beneficiaries.
Under it's corporate overview of 2007, "Google's stated goal is: "to
organize the world's information and make it universally accessible and
useful."80
There is little denial that Google functions are increasingly at the outer
boundaries permissible under current legal regimes. They bump into private
rights in intellectual matters, privacy (EU, Italy and the US), and
contemporary business models. They render obsolete historic models of
creation, production, distribution and consumption of intellectual content.
They cast a bright light to a future that overcomes historic theological and
practical limitations by offering change fundamental to the purpose and
functionality of copyright. They represent the emerging global sense of
enablement, as well that of deprivation, not enrichment. 81 At no time in the
history of humanity has the ability to use and create been so widely
distributed. The distributive abilities take into account literacy, curiosity
and technology. What response do we find from copyright holders and
institutions of law? These institutions treat the enabled public and emergent
technologies as the enemy. They increasingly limit the rights of user to
protect the status quo.82 One of the more illuminating presentations on
private rights, market structures and completion is a presentation on CNBC
in "Visions," focusing on innovation as the means of competing, not
exclusive rights. 83 Progress based on value added in a structure where all
78 See Robert I. Reis, The Sony Legacy: Secondary Liability Perspective, 3 AKRON
INTELL. PROP. J. 205 (2010) (discussing the inference in secondary liability cases and the
utility of technology transfer assessment protocols that would take into account potentials
represented by innovation).
79 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (recall how public domain rights were
minimized in Eldred).
80 Excerpt from Google's Corporate Values and Goals and How They Motivate Their
Employees, http://www.megaessays.com/viewpaper/202934.html (last visited June 7, 2010).
81 Michael D. Birnhack, The Idea of Progress in Copyright Law, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 3, 33 (2001).
82 See PATRY, supra note 12..
83 See Building a Global Leadership Brand, Technology, CNBC
http://classic.cnbc.com/id/l 5840232?video= 1296806145&play- 1 (last visited June 23,
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goods are otherwise free. It is this that constitutes the realization that
private rights "may" have little bearing on progress or the general well
being.
The paradox lies in how the Congress and the courts will treat the
onslaught of Google and like ventures as providers of progress and public
benefit through innovation fundamental to the underlying constitutional
purposes of intellectual progress. This is even more amazing since the
current course and conflict of private rights and emerging technologies was
anticipated by two prior congressional enactments: The National High-
Performance Computing Technology Act of 1989 and the High
Performance Computing Communication Act of 1991, neither of which to
date appear to have been used in as a base for resolution of conflicts such as
posed by Google. 84 Many thought this challenge would be in the context of
the Google Book Project. It was anticipated Google would proceed to
defend the action, likely based on public purpose, benefit and "fair use."
After all underlying technologies at the foundation of creative endeavors
reflect evolutionary processes core to copyright. The processes of "fixing"
for creation and distribution, such as printing press, photography,
lithographing technologies and distribution have evolved over time. New
technologies for these processes, such as telephone, radio, motion pictures,
recordings, television and video recorders all had their impact recognized
within the copyright acts both incorporating new formats of derivative
rights and extending protections to copyright holders. While each of these
advances and case law remain important, they are but the tip of accelerated
"r "evolution during the period of the past four decades, including the first
decade of this new millennium. The likelihood of "reconciliation" of vested
copyrights in the face of innovation remains within the four comers set by
statute and case law which are often backward looking and protectionist,
albeit in the eyes of the beholder.
The Google Book Project,8 5 in its simplest form, proposed to do what
many others had suggested before and after-to digitalize, achieve and
permit search and retrieval of the great literary treasures of the world.
Could there be any functional grouping that would better meet the
constitutional purpose of publication, distribution, searching, sorting, and
archival protection of the literary works of the nation and humanity? A
fairest and most noble of uses of technology to further the dream of
2011).
84 Rep. No. 102-66 (1991) (Conf. Rep.).
85 See generally James Grimmelmann, The Google Book Search Settlement: Ends,
Means and the Future of Books, AM. CONST. SOC'Y. FOR LAW & SOC. POL'Y, (2009),
available at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1024&context=jamesgrimmelmann.
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progress includes such efforts such as the digitization of libraries in Rome
and Florence, Italy86 , the Library of Congress' grant of two million dollars
to digitalize all books and documents87 , and other current and ongoing
ventures.
88
It makes one wonder whether if this was initially proposed as a
government sponsored grant or project, would they not have been likely to
receive accolades and support? Google's scanning technologies are at the
cutting edge in protecting rare and fragile manuscripts. The project is so
steeped in public purpose that many thought the interface of this incredible
project and technology would have been resolved in legal action by
copyright holders against Google with either a finding of fair use, or at least
a finding distinguishable by intent and purpose as a transformative use.
There are those who relished the notion that there might be a basic sense of
altruism behind Google's actions in fighting the good fight for fair use
based on its obvious financial ability to wage battle in the courts. Google is
no stranger to litigation, nor to the taste of vindication. That did not
materialize and leaves open the question of why not?
Can you think of a "fair use" defense that will be accepted by the
court in the context of the Google Book Project? Recall the purpose of the
project, to create a digital database by scanning copy every book accessible
in libraries cover to cover. To then store these works on their own servers
and make these data bases open and accessible to the world thus facilitating
access to all of a work in the public domain and limited access to
copyrighted works to enable the reader to determine whether to purchase
the book, or borrow a library copy, or pursue any other viable legal
alternative for further perusal or use of the copyrighted work.
The criteria detailed under section 17 U.S.C. § 107 states:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is
a fair use the factors to be considered shall include -
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
86 See Google to Digitise Ancient Italian Books, BBC, March 10, 2010,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8561245.stm.
87 See Christopher Dawson, New Project to Scan Brittle Books at Library of Congress,
ZDNET, Feb. 2, 2007, http://education.zdnet.com/?p=820.
88 See Google's book scanning faces competition, EScHOOLNEWS, Nov. 12, 2007,
http://www.eschoolnews.com/2007/11/12/googles-book-scanning-faces-competition/
[hereinafter Google Scan Competition].
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(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.89
How many of the statutory factors noted above does Google's project
pass or fail? Based on the extent of actual copying by the scanning project,
the argument would likely contend that the project exceeds the quantity
component of fair use criteria, thus making a finding of fair use most
difficult. Perhaps the question should be refocused from the more difficult
fair use issues to an alternative argument that regardless of the amount
copied, the intent and purpose of the copies constitutes a "transformative"
use serving a different purpose, such as in the case of Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music9° and Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc.9 1 A third alternative
might well posit that because the functionality of the Google book project
is that of a global library and search similar to a "card catalog, " it might
come under the exceptions of 17 U.S.C. § 108 applicable to libraries. This
proposition may arguably rest on the established underlying rational and
principle behind the "card catalog" exception, not limited to then existent
technologies. 92 A fourth alternative may simply take the position that this
was not considered by congress, nor provided for in the Copyright Act of
1976, and therefore a matter for the court to exercise its discretion absent
specific indications by Congress as to how to resolve the conflict. This
leads to questioning whether one thinks the court could have responded to
reason and the argument that Google's program lies at the core of copyright
purpose, and absent specific direction from Congress, should be
permissible. Are these inherently fundamental issues of copyright
ownership and the public interest? Are these circumstances where the
activities of Google and the alleged rights of the copyright holder are
''mutually exclusive" of one another? The safe course was that which the
court appears to have taken. Apparently, its decision was to await further
congressional direction, which would provide standards for protecting, to
the extent possible, and "reconciling". "conflicting" interests relative to
appropriate private right, public purpose and policy. 93 In this, thus, the
court deferred on the matter and did not presume to set policy within the
realm of the delegated powers to Congress.
94
Discretion is often the better part of valor thus leading Google
possibly to concede the fair use defense and split the pie in a "win-win"
89 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992).
90 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
91 508 F.3d 1146, 1164 (9th Cir. 2007).
92 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1994).
93 See supra note 71.
94 Id.
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paradigm for private rights and much of its innovation purpose. What of
the public interest? Why did the Court list the wide range of public benefit
then choose to discount it? A national response from the Attorney General
indicated a clear concern with the antitrust implications of the settlement
agreement. 95 The European Economic Union response was at first
questioning on competition grounds and the need to do further study on
copyright reform, the settlement agreement and public interest.96 Industry
representatives raised concerns about a defacto monopoly in Google - even
where no exclusive rights exist or will exist.
97
The concerns of the public regarding the settlement itself raised
serious issues affecting not only the rights of those who fit within the class
action, but of the lack of representation of the public interest. 98  Why
should Google have been able to agree to a structured settlement based on
private rights without due consideration of the implications for the
public? 99 What kind of precedent would this set for other book, artifact or
other scanning project?' 00 Why is any agreement needed at all?10 1 At least
one post argues that there are already better scan projects than Google
95 Statement of Interest of the U.S. Regarding Proposed Class Settlement, Author's
Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 8136, 2001 WL 3045979 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2009);
see also Statement of Interest of the U.S. Regarding Proposed Amended Settlement
Agreement, Author's Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 8136, 2010 WL 979111
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2009).
96 Commission Press Pack on Europeana.eu, Europe's Digital Library Doubles in Size
but also Shows EU's Lack of Common Web Copyright Solution (Aug. 28, 2009), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/information-society/newsroom/cf/itemlongdetail.cfmitem-id=5181.
97 See 770 F. Supp. 2d at 672 ("Rightsholders can exclude their Books from some or all
of the uses listed above, and they can remove their Books altogether from the database. At
any time Rightsholders can ask Google not to digitize any Books not yet digitized, and
Google will use "reasonable efforts" not to digitize any such Books. (ASA §§ 1.124,
3.5(a)(i)). A Rightsholder may also request removal from the Registry of a Book already
digitized, and Google is obligated to remove the Book "as soon as reasonably practicable,
but it any event no later than thirty (30) days." (ASA § 3.5(a)(i)").
98 See Request To Participate of Sony Electronics Sony's, Author's Guild, Inc. v.
Google, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 8136 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2009) (Sony addressed ASA's potential to
enhance consumer ability to search and find copyrighted content, increased volume and
variety of e-books available to the market place, and fulfilling the promise of increased
competition and progress in the marketplace). See also LETTER addressed to Judge Denny
Chin from Paul N. Courant, Author's Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 8136
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2009) (Mr. Courant writes on behalf University of Michigan's
advocating the "overwhelming benefits to libraries, the academy, the world....1").
99 Google Books Settlement Agreement
http://books.google.com/booksrightsholders/Settlement-Agreement.pdf (last visited June 8,
2010).
tOO See Mike Masnick, Complaints Against Google Book Scanning Project Reach
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under way.102 Based on the concerns brought to its attention, the court
deferred final action on the proposed settlement agreement. 10 3 This activity
is indicative of the broad and deep implications inherent in the interests of
the parties, the underlying technological issues and the rights of the public
pose in the resolution of the controversy.
One has to wonder whether there isn't a "Google effect" in the
presence of Google itself. Suppose it was not Google involved in this
project? Or, perhaps what if Google had applied for a grant to archive,
preserve and protect the writings of the past and present for posterity? Are
these two separate issues, or maybe not issues at all?
Beyond the ASA, the Viacom v. Youtube decision contrasts with the
reasoning and conclusion found in the Courts rejection of the ASA. At the
core of each are beneficial uses of content. In Google Books the benefit
lies in decades, even centuries of printed material covered by long settled
law; in Viacom it is digital video clips uploaded to the internet with inherent
ambiguities about rights, fair uses, and onus on enforcing those rights. Yet,
in Google books the Court defers to the Congress on an assumption that
they have not yet spoken on these matters. Structurally both the DMCA
and the Books registry provide opt-out provisions. Why didn't the Court
simply state that the ASA must comport with settled law including the
DMCA takedown policy? Why did the Google book court deem Google's
speed to market and technological effectiveness as unfair in light of their
ability to out-perform their competitors, yet rely on Perfect 10 for support
of their decision in Viacom? One can theorize that technological advances
and the underlying copyright issues that are presented to the court for
resolution tax the judicial process and ability of the court to manage and
resolve evolving issues which require balancing private rights and public
purpose. It may be simply that it is fear of the unknown that leads to a
"protection of sweat equity" perspective when the real concern is, and
always has been, the balance between limited exclusive rights, as an
incentive for creation, so that the public can reap the benefits from
"progress. 104
II. CONCLUSION
This little discourse ends with an awareness that foundations are
102 Google Scan Competition, supra note 88.
103 See, e.g., Archive of Google Books Status Conference,
http://copyright.columbia.edu/copyright/2009/10/07/google-books-status-conference/ (last
visited June 8, 2010) (detailing a "status conference" held to meet objections noted by the
U.S. Attorney General concerning revisions in the Google Books Agreement).
104 See supra note 8.
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important to review and bear in mind, with full appreciation that "change"
is not a value in itself, but rather the opportunity to right the ship, alter the
course and ensure purpose. But change we must and change we will
because every single premise and element of copyright, the public sense of
entitlement, the impact of exclusive rights under privatized copyright, the
complete "new world" represented by enablement, communication, file
transfers, digitalization of whole libraries and artifacts of the real world,
search engines, holographic representations and archiving for posterity are
here at the threshold. The public realizes this. Global populations demand
reform and in Europe have formed "pirate parities" seeking direct
representation in the EU legislative bodies for copyright reform. A pirate
party is reputedly being formed in England. And, likely after the tea (or
other soft drink) is served in this country, pirate parties may well be in play.
The goal is balance. The goal is to create a balance that changes as needed
with perspective on the value of private rights in a global economy and the
root of public right to the incidents necessary for "progress." There is no
balance in the consideration of public rights and goals and private right that
is more than a moment in time. Professor Goldstein is correct; there is too
much focus on the four factors of statutory criteria for fair use. The original
intent was birthed as an equitable and discretionary balance between public
and private rights. Treating it as cast in the shadows of a world that no
longer exists is the problem which Google creates. The resolution of the
Google paradox lies in measuring balance, and re-measuring and re-
measuring as the wonders of technological progress are realized and
distributed along the course to "Progress" itself. 
105
105 As to be expected, the Google saga continues to raise fundamental questions of
balance regarding constitutional purpose, the interpretation of congressional legislation and
the role of the court in protecting "progress," innovation and creative ventures. See e.g.,
Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., --- F.3d --,. 2012 WL 1130851 (2d Cir. 2012); and
Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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